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In February 2007, three Salvadoran congressmen, including Congressman Eduardo 
D’Aubuisson—the son of Roberto D’Aubuisson—and the founder of the Alianza Republicana 
Nactionalista Party (ARENA), were murdered on a Guatemalan farm near the town of El 
Jocotillo.1 At first, the killings appeared politically motivated, but later evidence indicated that 
the assassins tore apart the congressmen’s car in a search for drugs and money. Two days after 
the killings, authorities arrested four Guatemalan police officers for the murders, after they 
confessed that they thought the congressmen were Colombian drug dealers carrying cash. Three 
days after their confession, an armed commando entered the maximum-security jail where the 
arrested officers were held and shot them dead.2  
In the months that followed, the government prosecuted several high-ranking 
Guatemalans, including a congressman, state governor and at least twelve civilians and police 
officers in connection with the murders.3 The killings shocked Central America, but this type of 
violence was nothing new.  
El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua suffered from decades of civil war, which spilled 
over into Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the 
backward socioeconomic situation and the lack of reform in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
and even Honduras led to an escalation of their civil wars during the 1970s and1980s. The 
conflicts became a part of the Cold War, further heightening Central American tensions, as both 
the United States and the Soviet Union vied for regional influence by providing military 
assistance to revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces. The death tolls were high. In El 
Salvador, roughly 70,000 people lost their lives by the war’s end in 1992. Nicaragua suffered 
80,000 deaths by 1991, while Guatemala lost 200,000 people between 1954 and 1996.4   
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Central America’s civil wars devastated a generation, but the murders of the Salvadorian 
congressmen revealed a new trend in its turbulent history. Cocaine, that lucrative but illegal 
commodity, displaced ideology as the basis for Central America’s violence.   
Histories about the War on Drugs in Central America have focused on individual 
countries or criminal elements involved in narcotrafficking.5 However, the research has not 
discussed the impact of Central America’s civil wars and how they affected regional drug 
trafficking. How was Central America transformed into a hub for narcotrafficking during its civil 
wars? How did the post-civil war period influence Central America’s ability to respond to 
narcotrafficking? How did drug-related violence in Central America come to resemble the 
violence witnessed during its civil wars?  
Using newly acquired primary sources obtained through a U.S. Department of State 
declassification process, traditional open-source government documents and secondary sources, 
this paper attempts to show how Central America’s civil wars and its weak political institutions 
left the region vulnerable to narcotrafficking syndicates and violent criminal gangs that 
threatened to destabilize the region as a whole. The emerging narcotrafficking/gang problem led 
to the development of radical responses and contentious international counternarcotics programs 
that sowed regional instability similar to that experienced during Central America’s civil war era. 
The Initial Colombian-Mexican Connection in Central America 
During the 1980s, revolution in Central America facilitated the growth of regional 
narcotrafficking.6 Inconclusive allegations of drug trafficking were leveled against many of the 
participants, including the Contra organizations Ailanza Revlocionaria Democrática (ARDE) 
and the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN). Allegations also targeted Honduran 
protection for international trafficker Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros, the Sandinista Dirección 
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General de Seguridad del Estado (DGSE), and Cuba's Dirección General de Información (DGI) 
involvement with the Colombian guerrilla organization Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19). 
Authorities brought greater evidence against the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega (1983-
1989) for his association with the Medellín cartel, which led to the U.S. invasion of Panama in 
1989. While much has been written on this subject matter elsewhere, mentioning it is important, 
because the Medellín cartel developed narcotrafficking ties with every interest listed above 
during the height of the region's civil wars.7 
As the civil wars wound down in the early 1990s, a nexus between Mexican and 
Colombian drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) emerged. U.S. efforts to slow drug traffic in 
the Caribbean during the late 1980s with Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) 
motivated Andean drug traffickers to shift their trafficking operations to the Pacific corridor, 
towards Central America and Mexico.8 Corruption and the porous U.S. southwest border enabled 
Colombian DTOs to create solid partnerships with Mexican syndicates, which the Colombians 
used to smuggle cocaine and heroin into the United States.9 The Deputy Attorney General of the 
PGR in charge of Mexico’s anti-narcotics police, Javier Coello Trejo, succinctly described 
Mexico as a “trampoline for Colombian cocaine.”10 By 1989, 70 percent of Colombian cocaine 
was moving into Mexico, often run through Central America, which was used as a storage and 
transshipment point.11 For the Colombian and Mexican narcotraffickers, Central America offered 
an unchecked path to elude U.S. and Andean counternarcotics efforts. 
The Medellín cartel formed the initial Mexican-Colombian relationship in the late 1980s. 
Honduran trafficker Ramon Matta Ballesteros arranged the first known contact between Mexican 
DTOs and the Medellín cartel. Ballesteros introduced Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo (a.k.a. El 
Padrino), the leader of the Guadalajara cartel and father of the Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels, to 
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Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, a founding member of the Medellín cartel. In 1986, the murder of 
DEA Agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena led to the break-up of the Guadalajara cartel, which ended 
with Felix Gallardo's arrest in 1989. From jail, Gallardo orchestrated the division of the 
Guadalajara cartel among its “second generation” associates.12  
During this time, trafficker Arturo Eng Guerrero helped the Medellín cartel strengthen its 
ties with the Arellano Felix organization, which operated out of Tijuana.13 The initial Medellín-
Tijuana cartel operation took advantage of Mexican smuggling routes along the U.S. border. The 
Colombians paid Mexican smugglers $1,000 for each kilo of cocaine they moved into the U.S. 
The Medellín cartel reacquired the cocaine after it entered the country.14 
By the early 1990s, pressure from Colombian authorities forced the Medellín cartel to 
modify its operations. As a result, they gave Mexican syndicates more responsibility over 
trafficking operations. Rather than paying Mexican DTOs to move cocaine into the United 
States, the Medellín cartel provided Mexican DTOs, such as the Arellano Felix cartel, with 
cocaine, and allowed them to set up their own distribution networks in the United States.15 The 
1992 arrest of Javier Pardo Cardona, the Medellín cartel’s main contact with Mexican DTOs, 
signaled the decline of the Medellín's influence in Mexico. However, their rivals, the Cali cartel, 
had already filled the void.16  
According to the Department of State, because of Colombia’s focus on the Medellín 
cartel, the Calí cartel took responsibility for most of the trafficking through Mexico as early as 
1990.17 The U.S. State Department also reported that the Mexican government’s use of radar and 
its implementation of a shoot-down policy in 1990 caused the Cali cartel to put a moratorium on 
multi-aircraft drug convoys to Mexico. They shifted their aviation operations southward from 
northern Mexico into Guatemala and, sources suspect, El Salvador, in order to move the cocaine 
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through Mexico by surface vehicles to the U.S.18 Working together, the Mexican and Cali cartels 
moved their staging areas to southern Mexico and neighboring Central America.19 
The Cali cartel differed from the flamboyant Medellín cartel, best exemplified by Pablo 
Escobar. They preferred to associate with subtler Mexican traffickers who worked within the 
Mexican system. The Cali cartel developed close ties with Juan García Ábrego, the leader of the 
Gulf cartel.20 Abrego offered to handle all the cocaine shipments into the United States in 
exchange for 50 percent of the profits.21 By 1994, the Gulf cartel was handling as much as one-
third of all cocaine shipments into the U.S. from Cali cartel suppliers.22 In Guadalajara, Mexico, 
the Cali cartel established connections with the La Familia cartel, an anti-drug vigilante group in 
the state of Michoacan that evolved into a DTO affiliated with the Gulf cartel.23 
The Cali cartel also developed ties with Amado Carrillo Fuentes, who emerged as the 
undisputed leader of the Ciudad Juarez cartel by 1993. In January 1992, Cali cartel leader 
Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela met with Carrillo Fuentes in Guatemala, where they agreed that 
Carrillo Fuentes would fly 727 jets loaded with cocaine from Colombia to Mexico. Carillo 
Fuentes’ air trafficking operation earned him the nickname “Lord of the Skies.”24 The Cali cartel 
preferred to work with Fuentes because he maintained tight security and compartmentalized his 
organization. He influenced Mexican officials to look the other way, acting much like García 
Ábrego. For example, many believe Ábrego bribed Mario Ruiz Massieu, the Mexican Deputy 
Attorney General for Special Affairs, and Raul Salinas de Gortari to provide access to Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari.25   
According to a convicted trafficker, the “Gulf cartel grew” with the “support of the 
corrupt political system.” The Mexican police, the Policía Judicial Federal Mejicano (PJFM), 
“controlled 90 percent of the drug trafficking” because the cartels “control the PJFM.”26 The 
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rising power of the Mexican cartels led to increased trafficking throughout Central America. 
The Rise of the Mexicans 
As long as the Mexicans promised not to operate in the traditional Colombian 
strongholds of New York, Miami, and the rest of the U.S. eastern seaboard, the Mexicans and 
Colombians worked cooperatively.27 The dismantling of the Medellín cartel in 1993 and the Cali 
cartel in 1996 gave rise to the appearance of an estimated three hundred mini-cartels in Colombia 
that organized themselves into small, decentralized groups that worked together.28 As a result, 
the more dominant Mexicans cartels replaced the Colombians as major international traffickers. 
In 1996, Juarez cartel leader Carrillo Fuentes called for meetings across Central America 
between Colombian and Mexican traffickers. In those meetings, the Mexicans told the 
Colombians that they must give up their U.S. drug markets. The Colombians could transport 
cocaine from the Andean region, but could carry it only as far as Mexico, where the Mexicans 
paid them in cash. Carrillo Fuentes then controlled the transport and distribution of cocaine into 
the United States and assumed control over U.S. markets.29  Reeling from the break-up of the 
Medellín and Cali cartels, the decentralized Colombian cartels were in no position to oppose the 
Mexicans and, in many respects, preferred to leave the responsibility of moving cocaine into the 
United States up to them.30  
As part of the Colombian cartel decentralization process, the Colombians gave 
distribution rights to the Mexican cartels, so that much of the cocaine that moved through 
Mexico transited through Central America.31 The Alejandro Bernal Madrigal and Armando 
Valencia operation exemplifies the new trafficking arrangement and demonstrates how 
decentralized Colombian cartels formed close associations with the Mexicans. Through Bernal 
Madrigal and Valencia, the Colombian mini-cartels, such as the Norte de Valle cartel—an 
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offshoot of the Cali cartel,—cut deals with the Juarez and Arellano-Felix cartels. Diego 
Montoya, a member of the Norte de Valle cartel, organized multi-ton shipments for Bernal and 
Valencia, who then shipped twenty-to-thirty metric tons of cocaine every month through Central 
America to Mexico.32  
Guatemala: The Step into Central America 
From 1990, U.S.–Mexican drug interdiction efforts, including Mexican radar, led Andean 
drug traffickers to adjust their routes to southern Mexico and Central America.33 This shift 
occurred as Guatemala’s 40-year civil war continued in its remote northern highlands. 
Traffickers, such as the Cali cartel, shifted their air trafficking operations to Guatemala.34 By 
1993, 165-to-275 tons of cocaine and heroin out of an estimated eleven hundred tons produced in 
all of South America, moved through Central America annually.35 The cartels began 
transshipment operations using sea, land and air routes from Guatemala.36 Traffickers 
concentrated their activities in three regions: the coastal Pacific plains of southwestern 
Guatemala, the river valleys and isolated jungle flatlands of the northern Petén region and the 
area around Lake Izabal in eastern Guatemala. They considered Guatemala an attractive transit 
location because it had hundreds of unmonitored landing strips and no radar.37 
According to the U.S. Department of State, traffickers offloaded or transshipped cocaine 
via ground transport, or loaded it aboard general aviation aircraft for transfer from Central 
America to transshipment points in Mexico. For example, traffickers brought cocaine through 
Guatemala on its way to Mexico that was often initially moved from Colombia to remote parts of 
Panama. They moved the cocaine in small airplanes in order to avoid Panamanian radar stations, 
and then reloaded it onto aircraft that mixed with legitimate air traffic.38 They frequently 
airdropped drug cargos over land and sea, rather than risk landing in Guatemala. From 
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Guatemala, traffickers shipped narcotics to Mexico using traditional air transportation, cargo 
containers, tractor-trailers, automobiles and boats.39 To give perspective to Guatemala’s 
increased importance, the largest seizure in Guatemalan history occurred in 1991, when 
Guatemalan officials seized three-and-a-half tons of cocaine on March 6, 1991.40 
The rapid expansion of opium production in Guatemala during the late 1980s enhanced 
Guatemala’s attractiveness to traffickers. Growers cultivated ampola (opium poppy) in areas 
along the Mexican border with intense guerrilla activity. Mexican traffickers supplied the seeds, 
financing, and market for Guatemala’s opium acreage. They then smuggled the raw opium gum 
to laboratories across the border where they converted it into heroin.41 Most of the opium gum 
produced in Guatemala supplied Mexican heroin trafficking organizations operating in Chiapas. 
According to the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, the Procurador General de la República 
(PGR), were Guatemalan traffickers who sold their illicit product to Mexican traffickers, who 
then resold their product to Mexican laboratory operators and financiers, due to the price 
differentials between the two borders. Moreover, because planting was safer in Guatemala, 
Mexican traffickers preferred to purchase cheaper Guatemalan opium. In 1990, the price for a 
kilogram of opium in Guatemala was between $1,275-$1,450, compared to $6,550-$7,275 in 
Mexico.42 
Throughout the early 1990s, the border between Mexico and Guatemala was considered a 
“sieve” because of the high concentration of weapons, guerrillas and narcotics.43 The 
Guatemalan guerrilla organization Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) 
relied on weak border security along the Guatemalan-Mexican border, as they used Mexico as a 
location for weapons, rest, relaxation and training. Low-level Mexican officials, who seemed 
“more interested in extorting bribes…than halting the flow of illegal commodities,” assisted the 
8
International Social Science Review, Vol. 89 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol89/iss1/1
 
narcotraffickers.   
The U.S. Department of State expressed significant concern that Guatemala’s back roads 
and illicit airfields facilitated drug activity and supplemented the Nicaraguan pipeline to the 
Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional (FMLN) guerrilla movement in El Salvador.44 When the 
Guatemalan government attempted to take the initiative against trafficking, the URNG guerrillas 
declared that the struggle against narcotics was a cover for U.S. counterinsurgency 
intervention.45 Because of Guatemala’s poor human rights record, the U.S. stated it would not 
provide assistance to its military. Nevertheless, in 1991, the United States initiated a joint U.S.-
Guatemalan interdiction effort called Operation Cadence. The U.S. offered Guatemala an 
estimated $48.1 million in land, sea and air radar assets, as well as the deployment of U.S. law 
enforcement agents to assist with aircraft interdiction.  
Narcotrafficking Routes: The Expansion into Central America 
By 1990, the effects of civil war had wrecked Central America. El Salvador reeled from 
its decade-long civil war that did not end until 1992. Honduras had been converted into 
militarized nation with one of the poorest populations on the earth. Hostilities in Nicaragua, 
which lasted from 1981-1990, devastated the country economically and politically. Costa Rica 
endured the presence of Contra and Sandinista forces along its porous border, which threatened 
its status as a neutral nation. The overthrow of Manuel Noriega in December 1989 left Panama in 
an unbalanced state seeking to form a new and stable democracy. The void caused by civil war 
enabled narcotraffickers to flourish throughout the region. 
As early as 1987, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reported that Colombians and 
Mexicans were forming operational bases for trafficking in El Salvador and Honduras.46 As 
Central America’s civil wars ended, a process of “Colombianization” began, which the region 
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was unprepared to address. According to the U.S. government, the Central American nations had 
“neither the resources nor the institutional capability to address the new drug trafficking 
modes.”47 Traffickers who avoided Central America in the past because of armed insurrections 
now looked to Central America as a way to supplement their traditional transportation routes to 
the United States. Peace, accompanied by NAFTA's implementation on January 1, 1994, opened 
up Mexican and Central American borders.48 According to the DEA, “the entire Central 
American isthmus” became “a trampoline” with a lot of “cooperation among traffickers from 
different countries.”49 
The Salvadorian government and the FMLN signed a peace accord on February 1, 1992. 
As FMLN guerrillas and Salvadorian government soldiers laid down their arms, a wave of crime 
and general lawlessness spread throughout the country. U.S. State Department sources predicted 
that of the “thousands of unskilled demobilized FMLN combatants and Salvadorian soldiers,” 
some would retain their arms and resort to banditry.50  
While the main source of crime came from banditry along El Salvador’s roads, traffickers 
such as the Perrones and the Cartel de Texis—the main conduits for Colombian cocaine through 
El Salvador during the 1990s and the 2000s—used the Inter-American Highway to move cocaine 
and heroin towards Guatemala and Mexico.51 El Salvador’s President, Alfredo Christiani (1989-
1994) oversaw the peace accords and expressed deep concern over the expansion of the drug 
trade in his country.52 Since Mexico tracked aircraft, Salvadorian authorities believed that 
traffickers were taking advantage of their lack of radar to land and offload drug-laden aircraft at 
remote airstrips that once served El Salvador’s cotton fields along the Pacific coastline. 
Traffickers also moved narcotics via coastal smuggling, using El Salvador as a third-party transit 
route. To avoid scrutiny upon arriving in the United States, they changed the point of origin of 
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shipments from Colombia and Peru, by unloading them at the port of Acajulta.53 
 Nicaragua became a favored spot for narcotrafficking due to its remote and sparsely 
populated coastline, easy access to the Inter-American Highway and limited government 
resources to combat trafficking activities.54 Struggling to resolve its civil war beginning with the 
1987 Esquipulas Peace Agreement, Nicaragua could not cope with the expanding drug trade. 
According to Fernando Caldera, a Nicaraguan police chief, “[D]uring the Contra War,” drug 
traffickers stayed away from Nicaragua’s coast because they would run into a “well-trained army 
backed by widespread radar and counterespionage in the interior.”55 However, the Nicaraguan 
government of Violetta Chamorro (1990-1997), which supported United States counternarcotics 
programs, was unable to provide more than vocal assistance.56 After reductions in the armed 
forces in 1991, coupled with severe cuts to the police budget, Nicaragua’s anti-drug police force 
consisted of no more than half a dozen full-time officers in Managua. This left the Atlantic coast 
wide open to Colombian and Mexican traffickers. According to the DEA, airdrops from low-
lying aircraft to waiting speedboats frequently served as a shipment method along Nicaragua’s 
vast Miskito Coast, with its numerous inlets and estuaries.57 The DEA reported that starting in 
May 1990, drug trafficking had substantially increased out of Puerto Cabezas and the Bluefields 
of the Miskito coast.58 In 1991, Nicaraguan Vice Minister of the Interior Dr. Jose Pallais stated: 
“[N]arcotrafficking was becoming a problem for all Nicaraguans,” especially on the “Atlantic 
coast where trafficking was on the increase.”59 
Although Honduras did not suffer as heavily as its neighbors from the impact of civil war 
during the 1980s, it was an important transit route for cocaine entering the United States and 
Europe.60 In the wake of Matta Ballesteros’ SETCO operation in the mid-1980s, Colombian 
DTOs continued to move cocaine through Honduras. The significant Colombian groups 
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responsible for moving narcotics into Honduras included the Colombian Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (AUC), and the Norte de Valle del Cauca cartel.  
By the mid-1990s, Mexican DTOs, especially the Sinaloa cartel, took over the movement 
of Colombian cocaine through Honduras.61 Their predominant trafficking method was maritime 
smuggling, for which the fishing fleet provided excellent cover.62 Familial ties and a minimal 
government presence allowed the Bay Islands to serve as a transit center for Colombian and 
Mexican cocaine shipments.63 The DTOs also smuggled narcotics out of Honduras and into 
Caribbean islands, such as the Cayman Islands, where they then transported the drugs in smaller 
loads to Florida.64 
Costa Rica grew as a transit zone during the early 1990s. Costa Rica’s 1948 constitution 
outlawed a standing army. A scarcity of resources such as ships and aircraft and the lack of a 
professional police force hampered the country's narcotics control. During the Arias 
administration (1986-1990), Costa Rica looked at U.S. counternarcotics security assistance with 
suspicion.65 Owing to the nature of the war in Nicaragua and the ARDE presence on the border, 
Arias was concerned that U.S. military aid might be perceived as violation of Costa Rican 
neutrality. As a result, the Costa Rican police received only light arms to use against 
sophisticated smuggling networks.66 Costa Rica's weak police force left it vulnerable to 
penetration by criminal groups, narcotics traffickers from the Andean ridge and, potentially, 
international terrorists who sought to take advantage of Costa Rica’s pluralist, pacifist society, 
which tolerated differing ethical viewpoints.67  
Following a trafficking pattern seen in other Central American nations, planes and large 
“mother” ships dropped off plastic bundles of cocaine for smaller speedboats to pick up and ferry 
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to the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. In one incident, fishermen found an empty barrel equipped 
with a radio transmitter floating offshore with three thousand kilograms of cocaine. Costa Rican 
Interior Minister Luis Fishman Zonzinski declared that Costa Rica was “wide open to cocaine 
smugglers.” He added, “[W]e have no army, no radar, no planes, no boats… [T]here’s very little 
we can do to stop the growing flow.”68 
Panama remained an important center for money laundering and trafficking following 
Operation Just Cause, the U.S. invasion of Panama, which took place between December 1989 
and January 1990. U.S. officials were convinced that drug trafficking was increasing and that 
Panama had become a haven for money laundering, however, the DEA stated that Operation Just 
Cause only temporarily disrupted this activity.69 Panamanian strongman General Manuel 
Noriega had tightly controlled who ran drugs through Panama; in his absence, Panama became a 
“free for all” for drug trafficking. As a result of Noriega’s authoritarian legacy, the Panamanian 
government limited its defense and police force strength, adding to the chaotic atmosphere.70 
With $6 billion in foreign debt, a 14-16 percent unemployment rate between 1990 and 1992, and 
inadequate security, Panama's ability to deal with narcotrafficking looked worse than it was 
under the Noriega regime.71 
Panama was a major transshipment point for cocaine from the Andean region. With 135 
miles of impassible, dense rainforest in the Darien Gap on the Colombian border, seventeen 
hundred miles of coastline marked with coves suited for smuggling, and more than fifteen 
hundred offshore islands, Panama was a smuggler's dream.72 Smugglers sent drugs to Panama 
via sea and air, and then transferred them to larger ships in Panamanian waters or sent them out 
of the country via ports or airports.73 In addition, by 1993, ninety-hectare coca fields started to 
appear in the Darien region. Panama’s law enforcement agencies were simply unable to patrol all 
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of the transshipment points around Panama.74 
The Guillermo Endara government (1989-1994) wanted to work closely with the United 
States, but was marred by scandal. In 1990, the Panamanian newspaper El Siglo reported that 
Endara was associated with Interbanco, a bank accused of money laundering. Endara had been a 
lawyer and director for Interbanco from its start in 1974. Guillermo Ronderos Durán, a 
Baranquilla financier who founded the bank, had close ties to members of the Medellín and Cali 
cartels, including Rodriguez Gacha, Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela and the Ochoa brothers.75 This 
revelation and the imprisonment of Dagoberto Franco, the reporter who uncovered this 
information, undermined U.S. support for Panama’s anti-drug programs.76 
Money laundering in Panama was another major concern. For money launderers, the 
instability caused by the end of Noriega’s regime had been “bad for business,” but that soon 
changed following his overthrow. In 1991, bank deposits fueled by drug money reached $21 
billion, compared to the low of $8.5 billion in 1989. Moreover, the total number of shell 
companies in Panama used as fronts fell to eight hundred a month in 1989, but climbed to more 
than thirteen hundred a month in 1991.77 According to the DEA, the use of Panama as a money 
laundering center and Panama’s “inability or unwillingness” to curb those operations was the 
biggest problem for international law enforcement in Panama.78  
The Panamanians approached the issue of money laundering only half-heartedly, because they 
feared that confronting it would destroy both the banking sector and the Colón Free Trade 
Zone.79 Panama’s effort to control narcotrafficking was failing on all fronts. In 1994, the United 
States did not certify Panama as cooperating with the United States or taking adequate measures 
to adhere to the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances.80 
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Post-Civil War Counternarcotics Policy in Central America 
Some observers of U.S.-Central American relations have argued that the United States 
largely ignored the region in the aftermath of its civil wars.81 However, while U.S. military 
posturing decreased, the U.S. government did engage proactively with Central American 
governments to develop counternarcotics programs. As one 1990 State Department cable put it: 
“[A] well coordinated Central American counternarcotics strategy is desirable and worthy of 
pursuit.” It added, “[T]hough we must avoid overly ambitious goals which practically cannot be 
achieved, this does not mean that we should not try to get moving.”82  
The regional counternarcotics programs suffered from both a lack of resources and the 
Central American governments' myopic response to the need to implement a rigorous program to 
stop the Colombian and Mexican traffickers who worked with home- grown contrabandistas. 
According to a 1994 General Accounting Office report, “[N]one of the Central America 
countries had the resources necessary to purchase sophisticated equipment and to develop well-
trained personnel to combat well-financed, creative and highly adaptable traffickers.”83 To 
further illustrate this point, the State Department embassy in Panama observed in 1990 that 
“Central American countries need to understand better that they’re in it with the rest of us and so 
should take the problem seriously and pay more than lip service” to “just how serious the threat” 
was.84 
The post-war era presented hurdles to the establishment of effective counternarcotics 
programs in every country. Political questions surrounding demilitarization and 
professionalization ruled the debates regarding the creation of the new counternarcotics police 
forces. The Salvadorian and Guatemalan peace agreements put limitations on their creation. Both 
countries excluded active members of the military from counternarcotics forces in order to 
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prevent the military from influencing internal security. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas maintained 
that only the Contras had been involved in drug operations. The Chamorro government 
countered by stating that a counternarcotics program would remain “limited” as long as “the 
Ministry of Interior staff remained populated by Sandinista personnel.”85 Moreover, the 
counternarcotics program stalled with the formation of criminal bands called the Recontras. 
Former Sandinista soldiers who called themselves Recompas joined them. According to the U.S. 
Department of State, “[P]reoccupation with rural insurgency” prevented “government officials 
from focusing on the narcotics problem.”86  
 U.S. budgetary constraints reduced U.S. counternarcotics aid to Costa Rica from 
$272,000 in 1993, to $133,000 in 1995.87 According to the U.S. Department of State, the 
“government of Costa Rica” was expected to shoulder “a greater share of the burden for its 
internal security.”88 In Panama, the government hoped to achieve total demilitarization of the 
public security forces by eliminating all militarized aspects of the last twenty years. The fear of 
remilitarization gave rise to Panamanian reluctance to participate in any type of military effort to 
counter narcotrafficking.89 By 2000, the U.S. embassy in Panama observed that heavy drug 
trafficking by Colombian FARC guerrillas and drugs gangs had saturated the Panamanian 
border. AUC paramilitaries clashed with the FARC in the border region and threatened to target 
the Panamanian National Police (PNP) for their alleged collaboration with the FARC in the 
Darien region—a relationship that dated back to the dictatorship of Omar Torrijos (1972-1981).90 
Moreover, the U.S. embassy noted that Colombian gangs colonized Panama’s slums to provide 
logistical bases to move drugs, people and cash to Central America and the U.S.91 
Post-civil war narcotrafficking in Central America also contributed to institutional 
corruption. The demobilization of Central America’s military and guerrilla forces converted 
16
International Social Science Review, Vol. 89 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol89/iss1/1
 
many who participated in the civil wars into hired hands for Colombian and Mexican 
narcotraffickers.92 Observers of the War on Drugs alleged that the Central American militaries 
and their intelligence networks rented out their services to the cartels when they demobilized. In 
1990, the Nicaraguan (Sandinista) police chief Rene Vivas claimed that the militaries in Central 
America—specifically those in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala—which were protected by 
the U.S., controlled narcotrafficking.93  
The editor of the newspaper La Hora, Oscar Clemente Marroquin, summed up the 
situation: “[W]hen the war stopped, the state apparatus kept operating the same way,” but now 
“it protects organized crime.”94 In 2010, the United Nations claimed that many of the major busts 
involved connections to government officials, especially in the security and justice services.95 
Numerous examples exist to support the United Nations claim. In February 2002, 
Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) abolished the Departamento de Operaciones 
Antinarcóticas (DOAN), created in 1994 to serve as Guatemala’s anti-narcotics force. Portillo’s 
decision occurred after sixteen DOAN agents killed two villagers and held residents from the 
village of Chocón hostage for three days while searching for narcotics being transshipped 
through Chocón. Behind the scenes, claims arose that the agents were in Chocón to steal the two 
tons of cocaine allegedly in the town.96 In 2006, the Panamanian government expelled Major 
Oscar Herazo, the chief of police in the Santa Fe de Veraguas region of Panama, from the 
national police, because of his involvement with a criminal network that stole drugs from 
traffickers. Due to a lack of evidence, the Panamanian Supreme Court acquitted Herazo of his 
crime.97 In 2008, El Salvador’s national police chief, Francisco Rovira, was forced to resign from 
his position after an investigation revealed that two of his aides ran a security-consulting firm 
that advised suspected drug traffickers and used police license plates without authorization.98  
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The post-civil war integration of Central American police and military forces into 
counternarcotics forces made corruption inevitable. These few examples simply demonstrate the 
problem of narco-corruption and its potential to subvert Central American institutions from 
within. 
The Gang Nexus 
Nowhere did the post-war economic and political restructuring have a greater impact than 
on Central America’s youth. Young people, defined as those between fifteen and twenty-four 
years old, comprised 21 percent of the total population and suffered from an unemployment rate 
of over 10 percent in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama between 1995 
and 2005.99 The gang problem began when displaced and uneducated youth turned to crime as a 
solution to the challenges of demobilization and reconstruction.100 
U.S. deportation of Central American gang members who belonged to the Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Calle-18 (18th Street) also led to gang growth. Members of these 
gangs were children of refugees from El Salvador’s civil war imprisoned in the U.S. following 
the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The deportation of gang members began in 1994 and increased in 
1996, with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA).101 
Upon arrival in Central America, the deportees organized youth gangs in El Salvador. They then 
spread to the rest of Central America, especially to Honduras and then Guatemala, after its peace 
accord in 1996.102 Within Central America, the pandillas (gangs) looked to replicate the U.S. 
machismo street gang culture and lifestyle. The gangs earned notoriety for acts of violence, 
assaults and robberies committed daily against innocent civilians. Many demobilized guerrillas 
who had fought with the FMLN were young, which made them susceptible to joining the 
Salvadorian gangs.103 
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According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, “[C]ontrary to popular belief the 
gangs were highly structured and modeled” like a “guerrilla organization.”104 The gang leaders 
were former Special Forces members from both sides of the civil wars, which enhanced gang 
discipline. Former Honduran, Nicaraguan, Guatemalan and Salvadorian soldiers and guerrillas 
trained MS-13 and Calle-18 members in weapons firing, hand-to-hand combat, explosives 
fabrication and leadership.105 The military background of MS-13 and Calle-18 leaders allowed 
the gangs to take over urban territory and curtail police efforts to control gang activity.106 
Some gang members returned to the United States after their deportation, creating a 
revolving door phenomenon in which gang members started to move from north to south and 
south to north.107 In the process of crossing borders, the MS-13 and Calle-18 gangs became guns 
for hire and developed international connections with Mexican coyotes (smugglers of illegal 
immigrants) and DTOs.108 Moreover, the MS-13 and the Calle-18 solidified their alliance with 
the Mafia Mexicana (EME) prison gang. This alliance formed during the early 1990s, when the 
Central American gangs agreed to become sureños and pay homage to the Mexican Mafia in the 
tregua de sur (truce of the south).109 Assisted by the Central Americans, the EME, with its close 
association to Mexican DTOs, maintained control over a major portion of the U.S.-Mexican 
cross-border drug trade. In 2005, Hurricane Stan diminished the Mexican government’s border 
control resources. This enabled the MS-13 and Calle 18 to push into central Mexico, broadening 
their network. 110 
The gangs moved not only drugs, but also humans, which further extended their criminal 
enterprise. The Central American gang diaspora provided a well-connected criminal network that 
spread from Central America to the United States.111 The U.S. government feared that the gangs 
and the cartels in association with the coyotes could move members of Hezbollah and al Qaeda 
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from Central America into Mexico and then the U.S.112 While many critics doubted gang ties to 
Islamic terrorism, Juan Carlos Bonilla, the director of the Honduran police, argued that through 
Afghan nationals, al Qaeda had developed ties with the MS-13 in El Salvador and Honduras. He 
alleged that they provided the MS-13 with paramilitary training and financial support.113 
According to Attorney General John Ashcroft, a Saudi Arabian al Qaeda cell leader named 
Adnan G. El Shukrijumah met with members of the MS-13 in Honduras to discuss alien 
smuggling into Mexico and the United States in July 2004.114  
Mexican Cartel–Central American Gang Cooperation 
Gang and cartel activity along the U.S.-Mexican border was related to trafficking drugs, 
people and weapons.115 Despite rivalries among the Mexican cartels (El Chapo’s Sinaloa cartel, 
Osiel Cárdenas Guillén’s Gulf cartel, the Arellano Félix’s Tijuana cartel, and the Juárez cartel), 
pandillas such as the MS-13 and Calle-18, as well the Aztecas (who were allied to the EME and 
Nuestra Familia prison gangs), served the various cartels as guns for hire. They did so despite 
their differences over territory and control over local narcotics distribution.116 However, as the 
gangs’ participation in the drug trade increased, the MS-13 and Calle-18 became directly tied to 
El Chapo Guzman’s Sinaloa cartel and the Zetas—an offshoot of the Gulf cartel.  
A group of thirty deserters from Mexico’s Special Air Mobile Force Group (Grupo 
Aeromovil de Fuerzas Especiales, GAFES) formed the Zetas, a DTO initially employed as 
enforcers for the Gulf cartel. The Zetas were a powerful Mexican DTO that violently attempted 
to take control over Central American trafficking networks.117 They moved into Guatemala in 
2007. The Guatemalan Mendozas and Lorenzanas cartels hired the Zetas to squeeze out a rival 
DTO called the Leones cartel. In 2008, the Zetas completed the destruction of the Leones. 
However, rather than leave Guatemala, the Zetas took over the Leones' territory and put pressure 
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on the Mendoza cartel, whose members fled to Belize.118 At the same time, the Zetas developed 
links to Guatemala’s special operations unit called the Kabiles.  
When the Zetas moved into El Salvador, they used the Kabiles to provide military 
training for Zetas recruits, including members of the MS-13 and Calle-18.119 The Zetas initially 
used the MS 13 and Calle 18 as security along the Guatemalan and Honduran borders. As the 
Zetas and the mara gangs grew together, the gangs began to take payment in cocaine. Cocaine 
payments became a major source of violence as the gangs fought over distribution rights.120 The 
MS-13’s increasing coordination with the Zetas also led Mara leaders to formalize coordination 
among clickas in El Salvador and the U.S.121 Significantly, the MS-13 developed a presence in 
Nuevo Laredo where gang members from El Salvador, Dallas and North Carolina coordinated 
with the Zetas.122 
In addition to the Zetas, their rivals, the Sinaloa cartel, led by Joaquín “El Chapo” 
Guzmán, also asserted its power in Central America, especially in Honduras, by establishing its 
own heavily armed enforcer gangs, the Negros and Pelones. According to Honduran intelligence, 
El Chapo went to Honduras to establish a school of assassins who would eliminate the cartel’s 
rivals, including police officials. Between 2007 and 2008, El Chapo’s assassins executed various 
heads of criminal organizations in Honduras.  
After asserting its muscle, the Sinaloa cartel worked with an estimated twenty Honduran 
criminal families, including the MS-13 gangs, to move drugs provided by Colombian FARC 
guerrillas northwards.123 During the June 2009 Honduran constitutional crisis, the Honduran 
military, on orders from the Supreme Court, removed President José Manuel Zelaya (2006-2009) 
from office. Honduran resources were diverted to maintain order, which strengthened the hand of 
traffickers such as El Chapo.124 El Chapo took advantage of the turmoil. Intimidating the 
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Honduran government with the message “plata o plomo,” El Chapo coordinated the 
assassination of General Julian Gonzalez, the Honduran director of the Office for Combating 
Drug Trafficking, on December 8, 2009. Gonzalez alleged that the FARC was working with the 
Sinaloa cartel in Honduras. Asesinos de moto killed him, firing nine bullets into his utility 
vehicle.125  
By 2011, the Sinaloa cartel became the most influential Mexican cartel in Honduras. 
Protected by gang muscle from its base in Honduras, the Sinaloans consorted with the 
Guatemalan Lorenzana cartel (many of whom were arrested by the Guatemalan government, but 
operated from jail), and the Salvadorian Perrones cartel to move cocaine towards Mexico and the 
United States.126 
The Mano Dura 
The gang nexus overwhelmed Central America’s governments. Gang aggression 
manifested in school burnings, murder, and rape. Sensationalist coverage of heavily tattooed men 
accused of massacring entire families, or sending anti-government messages with severed heads, 
led to public support for drastic measures against the gangs.127 Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador implemented strict anti-gang laws, referred to as mano dura (heavy hand) policies. The 
Salvadorian government passed Decree 158, known as “the mano dura,” and Honduras passed 
legislation dubbed la ley anti-mara (anti-gang law) in 2003.128 Both laws allowed for the arrest 
of people who appeared to be gang members and toughened laws for their incarceration. In 2004, 
the Guatemalan congress launched Plan Escoba (Clean Sweep), which enabled the police to 
detain youth suspected of being in maras on the basis of their dress, hair and tattoos.129 In 2004, 
Salvadorian President Tony Saca’s Super Mano Dura anti-gang reforms led to over eleven 
thousand arrests. The Salvadorian maras adapted to the crackdown by directing their operations 
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The mano dura law's critics claimed that they led to violations of habeas corpus and 
extra-judicial killings, similar to those that took place during the civil war period. Opposition 
party members and judges condemned the measures, claiming that their provisions violated 
international human rights standards.131 When the military assisted the police in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, critics also questioned the use of the army in domestic security issues.132 As a result, 
the courts were slow to back the mano dura policies. The mano dura laws intensified the 
violence, which led the gangs to respond by toughening their entry requirements, adopting a 
more conventional look and using heavier weaponry, such as AK-47s and hand grenades, which 
in turn increased the crackdown on the gangs.133 
The Merida Initiative 
By 2008, two-thirds of all cocaine entering the United States passed through Central 
America into Mexico. The U.S. designated Panama, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala as 
major illicit drug producing and drug-transit countries.134 The Mexican cartels earned roughly 
$25 billion annually from the drug trade, compared to the regional GDP of $107.7 billion for 
Central America as a whole. The cartels could therefore easily buy off the poorly paid police and 
judges in Central America.135 With an inefficient legal system, get-tough tactics did not solve the 
narcotrafficking problem. Instead, murder rates in Central America spiked between 2000 and 
2009.136 
The United States, Mexico and Central America responded to the crime wave by 
launching a regional counternarcotics program. On October 22, 2007, the United States 
announced a $1.4 billion, three-year plan to help Mexico and Central America combat drug 
trafficking.137 The Mexican program, known as the Merida Initiative, put pressure on Mexico’s 
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borders and provided minor assistance to Central America.  
Plan Colombia’s continuation in 2008, as well as the Merida Initiative’s implementation, 
pushed the narcotrafficking problem into Central America. In other words, counternarcotics 
policies in Mexico and South America augmented the importance of Central American links put 
in place many years before.138 In order to draw attention to the needs of Central America as a 
distinct region and to strengthen the capacities of government institutions to address security 
challenges, the Merida Initiative for Central America was renamed the Central America Regional 
Security Initiative (CARSI) in 2010.139 
The CARSI program built upon the Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) 
strategy, a 1991 Central American regional integration effort that included the coordination of 
counternarcotics activities.140 CARSI’s goal was to produce a secure region where criminal 
organizations no longer wielded the power to destabilize governments or threaten national and 
regional security, while simultaneously preventing the entry and spread of illicit drugs, violence 
and transnational threats.141 CARSI prioritized its efforts in the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras), where the U.S. considered crime and violence to be most severe.142 
CARSI also envisioned an integration of security efforts to include the littoral waters of the 
Caribbean.143 
The 2009 initiative was divided into three pillars of activity: 1) counternarcotics, 
counterterrorism and border security; 2) public security and law enforcement and 3) institution 
building. Of the initial funding, $16.6 million went to pillar one to pay for requests for training 
on aviation, port and document security, while $34 million went to pillar two to provide support 
and community prevention activities to combat gangs.144 The DEA, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
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Enforcement Affairs (INL) vetted Central American unit programs that investigated money 
laundering; bulk cash smuggling and narcotics, firearms and human trafficking.145 Pillar three 
received $7.7 million for court management, prison management, community-policing programs 
and asset-forfeiture training.146 
CARSI was referred to as “Plan Colombia” for Central America, which was not meant as 
a compliment. Journalists, political observers and human rights activists, including the UN, 
criticized Plan Colombia for its emphasis on a military/police solution to Colombia’s narcotics 
production, trafficking and guerrilla insurgencies/paramilitaries, all of which were interrelated. 
Its critics faulted it for failing to address the socio-economic and political factors that drove 
Colombia’s drug war.147 The enforcement aspect of the CARSI plan, like Plan Colombia, was 
rebuked for militarizing the drug war in Central America, because it gave Central America’s 
military and police forces the power to apply indiscriminate force to suppress narcotrafficking. 
According to the U.N., “heavy-handed crackdowns” only led to more violence.148 Laura 
Chinchilla, Costa Rica's former Minister of Justice and current President (2010-present), stated 
that, “instead of opting for public security policies that focused on prevention and rehabilitation,” 
Central America had decided instead to take a “mano dura” or “every man for himself approach: 
hire private security, buy guns, etc.”149 
To provide an alternative to heavy-handed crackdowns, in March 2012, Salvadorian 
President Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) radically changed his country’s anti-gang approach by 
negotiating a truce with the MS-13 and Calle 18 gangs. In exchange for a reduction in homicides, 
the Salvadorian government transferred gang leaders to less secure prisons.150  
From the beginning, the truce was tenuous. The government was reluctant to negotiate 
with criminal groups and feared that the gangs were increasing their political legitimacy from 
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jail. Between March 2012 and May 2013, homicides in El Salvador declined from an average of 
twelve per day to five per day.151 However, as the truce continued, gang leaders claimed that 
death squads such as the Sombra Negra (Black Shadow) were targeting them.152 The November 
2013 discovery of a mass grave with forty-four victims killed by the MS-13 and an increase in 
the murder rate between June 2013 and May 2014 to an average of 9.48 murders per day threw 
cold water on the truce. President Funes declared it a failure.153 El Salvador’s attempt to develop 
an alternative to heavy-handed tactics had an effect directly contrary to the government’s 
intentions: criminal enfranchisement and death squads. 
Between 2008 and 2011, the U.S. spent $361.1 million on the CARSI program. It 
allocated 23 percent to Guatemala, 17 percent to El Salvador, 13 percent to Honduras, and 10 
percent to Panama, while offering smaller amounts to the rest of Central America.154 The Central 
American governments reproved CARSI, pointing out their countries received less aid, even 
though Central America was more violent than both Mexico and Colombia. Honduran Security 
Minister Óscar Álvarez called U.S. aid, “a drop in the bucket.”156 
CARSI raised another concern: the root fire effect. Enforcement pressure in Mexico and 
Central America caused traffickers to pop up elsewhere, such as Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, where few resources existed to cope with narcotrafficking.155 In May 2011, 
Guatemalan President Álvaro Colom (2008-2012) declared Guatemala’s northern border to be in 
a state of siege, fueling further criticism of CARSI.  
To counter claims that the CARSI program had failed, William Brownfield, Assistant 
Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, asserted that 
U.S. policy was “not a ‘war’ on drugs,” and that CARSI would take “not days, weeks, and 
months, but years.” Brownfield added that at the “end of the day,” CARSI’s success would be 
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measured “through a variety of factors,” including: homicide, prosecution, poverty and education 
rates; air and maritime tracks; gang activity and gang truces.”156 Despite the opposition, the U.S. 
commitment to CARSI continued. In 2013, the United States provided $135 million for CARSI 
representing a 33 percent increase over 2011 funding.157 
Conclusion 
Central America’s narcotrafficking problem began during its civil war period, as regional 
instability and Andean-Mexican counternarcotics efforts pushed narcotraffickers into the region. 
Reeling from decades of civil war, Central America was unprepared for peace. The persistence 
of long-standing socio-economic problems made it impossible for Central America to counter the 
Colombian and Mexican DTOs that were firmly entrenched by the time peace arrived.  
The politicization of Central America’s post-war police reorganization hampered 
enforcement efforts and opened the door to corruption. At the same time, the appearance of 
Central American gang networks—a legacy of the civil war—strengthened the position of 
Mexican narcotraffickers. As the gangs entered the “narcosphere”, they extended their influence, 
as well as the influence of Mexican DTOs, from Central America to the United States. 
 Violence once associated with the Cold War exploded as Central America cracked down 
on the gangs and Mexican DTOs. Central American counternarcotics operations began to 
resemble the internal security policies employed during the civil war era. However, opposition to 
the mano dura policies, or military participation in counternarcotics programs such as CARSI, 
proved counterproductive, because it undermined the security efforts that countered the 
subverting influence of gangs and narcotraffickers. By 2010, the violence in Central America 
resembled the violence that existed there during the 1980s. Nothing had changed except that 
Central America’s Cold War violence and instability had metamorphosed into the War on Drugs. 
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Major questions persist. Is it too late to reverse narcotrafficking’s subverting influence in 
Central America? Are get-tough measures the cause of continued instability? Would less 
proscriptive policies have better results if narcotics continue to be illegal? Should 
producer/transitory nations be forced to bear the burden of counternarcotics programs that they 
are unprepared to undertake, or should they share an international obligation to control 
narcotrafficking within their sovereign territory? Will the root-fire effect of increased 
enforcement lead to the opening of new smuggling routes? Will the fight against the gangs and 
cartels push them into a more dangerous alliance with Middle Eastern terrorists? Do lax 
immigration and weak border security policies contribute to the expansion of narcotrafficking 
networks in the U.S.?  
The 2014 Central American child refugee crisis ties into the failure to respond effectively 
to narcotrafficking in the post-civil war era, and it begs the final question: Are U.S. programs 
such as CARSI too little, too late?  
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